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DOMESTIC RELATIONS
Melissa J. Roberts *
I. INTRODUCTION
Several significant developments in the area of domestic relations
law took place in the past year. This article summarizes the key
judicial decisions and legislative enactments pertaining to child
support, child custody and visitation, marriage and divorce, spousal
support, equitable distribution (including property classification and
valuation) property settlement agreements, adoption, domestic
violence, jurisdiction, and procedure that occurred from June 1,
1998 through May 15, 1999.
II. CHILD CUSTODY AND VISITATION
A. Parent Relocation
1. Judicial Decisions
Parent relocation remains a hot topic in Virginia. In Parish v.
Spaulding,' the Supreme Court of Virginia addressed the trial
court's procedure, but not the substance of the trial court's determi-
nation that the best interests of the children would be met by
allowing the mother to relocate with the children from Virginia to
Indiana.2 The mother, who had sole custody of the children, ignored
an injunction issued by the juvenile court ordering her not to remove
the children from Virginia when she and the children moved to
Indiana.3 The circuit court held an ore tenus hearing on the father's
* Associate, Mays & Valentine, L.L.P., Richmond, Virginia. B.A., 1994; J.D., 1997,
University of Virginia.
1. 257 Va. 357, 513 S.E.2d 391 (1999).
2. See id. at 361, 513 S.E.2d at 393.
3. See id. at 360, 513 S.E.2d at 392. The mother made numerous attempts to obtain
court permission to relocate with the children to Indiana. See id. at 359-60, 513 S.E.2d at 392.
The circuit court and the juvenile and domestic relations district court refused to hear her
requests due to lack of jurisdiction during the pendency of an appeal on the initial custody
order. See id. Similarly, the Virginia Court of Appeals denied the mother's request to allow
the trial court to adjudicate the relocation issue while the appeal was pending. See id. at 359,
513 S.E.2d at 392.
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motion to modify custody and visitation.4 The circuit court held that
the move to Indiana was in the children's best interests because it
would offer the family economic stability.5 After the Virginia Court
of Appeals affirmed this decision, the father appealed on the grounds
that the trial court denied him due process by conducting the
proceedings after the mother's move occurred and erred by failing to
enforce the juvenile court's injunction.6 The Supreme Court of
Virginia found that the post-move hearing properly afforded the
father his due process rights of notice and an opportunity to be
heard.7 The court also approved of the manner in which the trial
court conducted its proceedings because the trial court based its
decision "on the facts existing at the time of the move, rather than
on evidence relating to the parties' changed circumstances after the
move."' Moreover, the court held that the trial court did not err in
failing to enforce the juvenile court's injunction because "[t]o require
the children to return to Virginia irrespective of their best interests
would have violated the requirement that courts act only in
furtherance of those interests."9 Thus, the supreme court allowed the
mother to manufacture a change of circumstances by moving without
the court's permission.
2. Legislative Developments
In its most recent session, the Virginia General Assembly
declined to pass the Model Relocation Act that was published
recently by the American Academy of Matrimonial Lawyers.' ° The
Model Relocation Act sets forth, among other things, provisions
concerning notice of and objections to a custodial parent's relocation
with the child, and indicates that a proposed or actual relocation
4. See id. at 361, 513 S.E.2d at 392-93.
5. See id. The trial court concluded that the move was necessitated by the mother's
financial difficulties and her new husband's inability to obtain employment in Virginia. See
id. at 360-61,513 S.E.2d at 392-93. The move would allow the family to live rent-free with the
new husband's family in Indiana and to take advantage of several educational opportunities.
See id.
6. See id. at 361-62, 513 S.E.2d at 393.
7. See id. at 362,513 S.E.2d at 393 (distinguishing its prior holding in Gray v. Gray, 228
Va. 696, 698, 324 S.E.2d 677, 678 (1985), that "before a court permits a custodial parent to
remove a child from the Commonwealth, it must determine that removal is in the child's best
interest") (emphasis added).
8. Id. at 362, 513 S.E.2d at 393-94.
9. Id. at 363, 513 S.E.2d at 394 (noting that the father's remedy was to seek sanctions
against the mother, not the return of the children) (citing Bottoms v. Bottoms, 249 Va. 410,
413, 457 S.E.2d 102, 104 (1995); Keel v. Keel, 225 Va. 606, 610, 303 S.E.2d 917, 920 (1983)).
10. See S.B. 950, Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg. Sess. 1999).
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with a child constitutes a change in circumstances that may justify
a modification of a custody award."
B. Grandparent Visitation
In June 1998, the Supreme Court of Virginia in Williams v.
Williams 2 held that grandparents are not entitled to visitation with
a child over the objection of both of the child's parents.'" The
supreme court analyzed Virginia Code section 20-124.2(B), which
allows persons with a legitimate interest in the child to have
visitation if it is in the child's best interests,' 4 and agreed with the
Virginia Court of Appeals that the provision is constitutional." The
supreme court also did not disturb the finding of the court of appeals
that parents have a fundamental right protected by the Fourteenth
Amendment of the United States Constitution to raise their
children, and that this right can be overcome only by a compelling
state interest. 6 Thus, '"before visitation can be ordered over the
objection of the child's parents, a court must find an actual harm to
the child's health or welfare without such visitation.""' Because
there was no such allegation in this case, the supreme court (1)
affirmed the decision of the Virginia Court of Appeals that denied
the grandparents visitation; (2) held that a remand was unneces-
sary; and (3) dismissed the grandparents' petition for visitation. 8
In May 1999, however, the Virginia Court of Appeals in Dotson v.
Hylton 9 held that section 20-124.2 of the Virginia Code21 only
applies where both parents in an intact family object to the grandpar-
ent's visitation with the child.2' When one of the parents objects to
the visitation and one of the parents requests the visitation, courts
may award visitation to the grandparent "upon a showing, by clear
and convincing evidence, that the best interests of the child would
11. See MODEL RELOCATION ACT §§ 201-07, 301-03, 404 (American Acad. Matrimonial
Law. 1997).
12. 256 Va. 19, 501 S.E.2d 417 (1998).
13. See id. at 22, 501 S.E.2d at 418.
14. See VA. CODE ANN. § 20-124.2(B) (Repl. Vol. 1995 & Cum. Supp. 1999).
15. See Williams, 256 Va. at 21, 501 S.E.2d at 418.
16. See id.
17. Id. at 22, 501 S.E.2d at 418 (quoting Williams v. Williams, 24 Va. App. 778, 784-85,
485 S.E.2d 651, 654 (Ct. App. 1997)).
18. See id.
19. 29 Va. App. 635, 513 S.E.2d 901 (Ct. App. 1999).
20. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-124.2 (Repl. Vol. 1995 & Cum. Supp. 1999).
21. See Dotson, 29 Va. App. at 638-39, 513 S.E.2d at 903 (distinguishing the Williams
case).
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be served."22 Under the circumstances inDotson, a grandparent does
not have to demonstrate a compelling state interest, such as that
withholding grandparent visitation would be detrimental to the
child's welfare, before the court may apply the best interests of the
child standard.23
C. New Legislation
Mediation of divorce and custody cases is becoming increasingly
popular. With the enactment of new legislation, the 1999 General
Assembly enlarged the permissible subjects parties may address in
mediating custody cases. Effective July 1, 1999, "[w]hen mediation
is used in custody and visitation matters, the goals [of mediation]
may include development of a proposal addressing the child's
residential schedule and care arrangements, and how disputes
between the parents will be handled in the future."24
In addition, the Virginia General Assembly added an additional
consideration in determining the best interests of a child. Courts are
required to consider each parent's ability to resolve disputes
regarding matters affecting the child for purposes of determining
custody and visitation arrangements.' Before this amendment, the
statute required courts to consider "the ability of each parent to
cooperate in matters affecting the child."26
III. CHILD SUPPORT
A. Judicial Decisions
The Virginia Court of Appeals continued to require judges to
make written findings supporting deviations from Virginia's child
support guidelines and to calculate the presumptive amount of child
support before deviating from those guidelines.27 Virginia courts also
22. Id. at 640, 513 S.E.2d at 903.
23. See id. at 640, 513 S.E.2d at 903-04.
24. S.B. 990, Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg. Sess. 1999) (enacted as Act of Mar. 27, 1999, ch.
574, 1999 Va. Acts 872) (codified as amended at VA. CODE ANN. § 20-124.2(A) (Cum. Supp.
1999)).
25. See VA. CODE ANN. § 20-124.3(6) (Cum. Supp. 1999).
26. Id. (Repl. Vol. 1995).
27. See, e.g., Hackett v. Hackett, No. 2640-97-2, 1999 Va. App. LEXIS 176, at *1-2 (Va.
Ct. App. Mar. 23, 1999) (unreported decision) (finding that the trial court erred in failing to
calculate the presumptive amount of child support and failing to provide a written
explanation in the order); Shields v. Shields, No. 1277-97-4,1998 Va. App. LEXIS 310, at *7-8
(Va. Ct. App. June 2, 1998) (unreported decision) (finding that although the parties'
[Vol. 33:939
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continued to require parties to present sufficient evidence of
voluntary unemployment or underemployment and of available or
previous higher paying jobs before imputing income to a party for
purposes of calculating child support.28 Although reluctant to deviate
from the child support guidelines, Virginia courts typically will
deviate from the guidelines upon a showing of "demonstrated
need."2 9 In Ratcliffe v. Ratcliffe, ° for example, the Caroline County
Circuit Court made an upward deviation from the guidelines by
requiring the father to pay an additional $380 per month for one-half
of the expenses of sending the parties' two children to a private
Christian high school.3 The court was convinced by the mother's
argument that, where the parents' had the ability to pay for the
school, it was in the children's best interests to continue attending
the school in which they had been placed by their parents prior to
the marital separation.32
B. New Shared Custody Support Guidelines
After extensive study and debate,33 the 1999 Session of the
Virginia General Assembly amended Virginia's child support
agreement, which the court recognized, provided grounds for a deviation, the trial court erred
in failing first to calculate the presumptive amount of child support under the guidelines).
28. See, e.g., Niemiec v. Virginia Dep't of Soc. Serv., 27 Va. App. 446,450,449 S.E.2d 576,
578-79 (Ct. App. 1998). InNiemiec, the Virginia Court ofAppeals reversed the decision of the
trial court that deviated upward from the child support guidelines by imputing income to the
wife, who was working part-time but who earned more income during the marriage by
working as a day care provider in the home. See id. at 45-52, 449 S.E.2d at 579-80. The father
failed to show that day care provider positions were available to the wife and failed to present
evidence enabling the trial court to determine the amount of income the wife should have
been earning. See id. at 450, 449 S.E.2d at 579.
29. See, e.g., Ratcliffe v. Ratcliffe, No. CH96-142, 1999 WL 316858, at *2 (Va. Cir. Ct.
Caroline County May 5, 1999) (unreported decision); see also Ryan v. Ryan, No. 147391, 1999
WL 262407, at *1 (Va. Cir. Ct. Fairfax County Feb. 1, 1999) (unreported decision) (ordering
that the father was entitled to a downward deviation from the guidelines where the children
spent a substantial portion of time with the father, but the father did not have enough "days"
with the children to warrant application of the shared custody rules).
30. No. CH96-142, 1999 WL 316858, at *1 (Va. Cir. Ct. Caroline County Feb. 1, 1999)
(unreported decision).
31. See id. at *4.
32. See id.
33. In 1998, the Virginia General Assembly passed a joint resolution requiring the
Virginia Bar Association Coalition Committee on Family Law Legislation to study the
formula for computing the number of days of custody and the definition of a day for child
support calculations. See H.J. Res. 141, Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg. Sess. 1998).
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statute.34 The amended statute, which became effective on July 1,
1999, adopts a formula for child support that factors in the amount
of time a child spends with each parent and the income of each
parent.35 The amended statute provides that the basic amount of
child support under the shared custody guidelines will be 140%,
instead of 125%, of the basic amount of support from the sole custody
guidelines.36 The statute also decreases the threshold for using the
shared custody guidelines from 110 to 90 visitation days per year.3
The new statute eliminates the "cliff effect," the term often used to
describe the sharp reduction in a parent's child support obligation,
once the parent has the child for 110 days. Hopefully, the statute will
reduce litigation by parents over a few days of visitation.
In addition, the Virginia legislature redefined a"day" for purposes
of the shared custody guidelines.38 Effective July 1, 1999, a "day"
means a period of twenty-four hours; however, where the parent who
has the fewer number of overnight periods during the year has an
overnight period with a child, but has physical custody of the shared
child for less than twenty-four hours during such overnight period,
there is a presumption that each parent shall be allocated one-half
of a day of custody for that period. 9
34. Both houses ofthe Virginia General Assembly passed measures to amend and reenact
Virginia Code section 20-108.2. See S.B. 1085, Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg. Sess. 1999) (enacted
as Act of Mar. 29, 1999, ch. 808, 1999 Va. Acts 1458) (codified as amended at VA. CODE ANN.
§ 20-108.2 (Cum. Supp. 1999)); H.B. 2407, Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg. Sess. 1999) (enacted as
Act of Mar. 29, 1999, ch. 836, 1999 Va. Acts 1520) (codified as amended at VA. CODE ANN. §
20-108.2 (Cum. Supp. 1999)).
35. See VA. CODE ANN. § 20-108.2(G)(3)(a) (Cum. Supp. 1999).
36. See id. § 20-108.2(G)(3)(a)(iii) (Cum. Supp. 1999) (increasing the multiplier from 1.25
to 1.4 for determining "total shared support").
37. See id. § 20-108.2(G)(3)(a) (Cum. Supp. 1999). In calculating each parent's "custody
share," the following is used:
the number of days that a parent has physical custody of a shared child per year
divided by the number of days in the year, the year may begin on such date as is
determined in the discretion of the court, and the day may begin at such time as
is determined in the discretion of the court.
Id. § 20-108.2(G)(3)(a)(ii) (Cum. Supp. 1999).
38. Previously, a"day" was defined as a continuous and uninterrupted period of 24 hours.
See Ewing v. Ewing, 21 Va. App. 34, 37, 461 S.E.2d 417, 418 (Ct. App. 1995). The new
definition ofa"day" solves the problem created in Ewing, where the Virginia Court ofAppeals
created a year with less than 365 days because neither parent received credit for days where
neither parent had the child for a full 24 hours. See id. The new definition of a "day" specifies
that days will be calculated for the parent who has "the fewer days of physical custody," and
the "'custody share' of the other parent shall be presumed to be the number of days in the
year less the number of days calculated as the first parent's 'custody share." VA. CODE ANN.
§ 20-108.2(G)(3)(a)(ii) (Cum. Supp. 1999).
39. See id. § 20-108.2(G)(3)(c) (Cum. Supp. 1999).
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The new statute provides that if each party has more than ninety
days of visitation, child support is either the shared custody support
amount or the sole custody support amount if a party "affirmatively
shows that the sole custody support amount ... is less than the
shared custody support amount."4" Thus, courts and practitioners
should calculate the sole custody support and the shared custody
support amounts in order to determine which amount is less.
The amended statute also provides that parents should divide any
extraordinary medical and dental expenses incurred by the child in
accordance with their income shares, regardless of how many visita-
tion days the child spends with each parent. 1
After July 1, 1999, parties with court orders awarding them more
than ninety days of visitation per year, as calculated under the new
definition of a "day," can petition the court for a modification of child
support because the amended statute most likely will be considered
a change in circumstances.42
C. Other Legislative Developments
As of July 1, 1998, Virginia courts, by statute, have the discretion-
ary authority to order a party to execute all tax forms and waivers
necessary to grant the other party the tax dependency exemption for
children for "any tax year or future years."43
In 1998, the Virginia General Assembly also enacted several
measures to facilitate enforcement of child support orders. For
example, Virginia Code section 63.1-250.1:3' established a Child
Support State Case Registry for all child support orders entered or
modified on or after October 1, 1998." In addition, Virginia Code
40. Id. § 20-108.2(G)(3)(a) (Cum. Supp. 1999). The amended statute provides that "[i]fthe
gross income of the payee is equal to or less than 150 percent of the federal poverty level
promulgated by the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services from time to time, there
shall be a presumption that the sole custody guideline calculation shall apply." Id. § 20-108.2
(G)(3)(d) (Cum. Supp. 1999).
41. See id. § 20-108.2(G)(3)(b) (Cum. Supp. 1999).
42. See Milligan v. Milligan, 12 Va. App. 982, 988, 407 S.E.2d 702, 705 (Ct. App. 1991)
(holding that the legislative enactment of the child support guidelines and the shared custody
statute constituted a material change in circumstances thereby allowing the court to review
previously ordered child support awards); Slonka v. Pennline, 17 Va. App. 662, 663, 440
S.E.2d 423, 424 (Ct. App. 1995).
43. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-108.1(E) (Cum. Supp. 1999).
44. Id. § 63.1-250.1:3 (Cum. Supp. 1999).
45. See id. (providing that the Department of Social Services will maintain a registry that
contains case records of services provided by the Division of Child Support Enforcement, "all
support orders established or modified in the Commonwealth on or after October 1, 1998,"
and records regarding paternity).
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section 63.1-250,41 which relates to the Department of Social
Services's efforts to collect support for dependent children, expanded
the definition of "income" in determining a party's child support
obligation.a7 The expanded definition broadened the types of income
that may be withheld pursuant to an Income Deduction Order for
collecting support.48 After July 1, 1998, an employer must make all
payments to the Division of Child Support Enforcement, instead of
directly to the support recipient.4" In fact, if an Income Deduction
Order "orders payment to an entity other than to the Department of
Social Services or the Department's designee . . . the order shall be
void."50 Thus, parties and practitioners should weigh the advantages
and disadvantages of involving the Division of Child Support
Enforcement before requesting an Income Deduction Order.
Effective July 1, 1999, a court in child support determinations
may require the custodial parent to present documentation verifying
expenses incurred for employment-related child care at the request
of the noncustodial parent.5
IV. MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE
A. Marriage
A bill authorizing covenant marriages, which is a form of marriage
where the parties must (1) obtain premarital counseling; (2) sign a
declaration of intent acknowledging that marriage is a lifelong
relationship; and (3) agree to obtain marital counseling when marital
difficulties arise before entering into such marriage, was introduced
last year.52 The bill requires a two-year separation before the parties
to such marriages may obtain a no-fault divorce.53 The bill failed in
the most recent session of the General Assembly.54
46. Id. § 63.1-250 (Cum. Supp. 1999).
47. See id.
48. See id. § 20-79.3 (Cum. Supp. 1999).
49. See id. § 20-79.3(B) (Cum. Supp. 1999).
50. Id.
51. See H.B. 2658, Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg. Sess. 1999) (enacted as Act of Mar. 28, 1999,
ch. 690, 1999 Va. Acts 690) (codified as amended at VA. CODE ANN. § 20-108.2 (Cum. Supp.
1999)).
52. See H.B. 2736, Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg. Session 1999).
53. A covenant marriage is a form of marriage where the parties agree beforehand to
meet the three requirements explained in the text. It also takes longer for parties to obtain
a divorce.
54. See H.B. 2736, Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg. Sess. 1999).
[Vol. 33:939
DOMESTIC RELATIONS
B. Grounds for Divorce
1. Judicial Decisions
In Glaze v. Glaze,55 the Circuit Court of the City of Richmond
found that a married woman cannot commit adultery by engaging in
sexual relations, particularly sodomy, with another woman.56 In
order for a wife to be guilty of adultery, she must have engaged in
sexual intercourse with a person of the opposite sex.57 Accordingly,
the court denied the husband's request for pendente lite relief
because the only ground for divorce stated in his bill of complaint
was that his wife committed adultery with another woman.58
After the plaintiff in Glaze amended his Bill of Complaint and
alleged sodomy, the wife sought to have the case dismissed on the
ground of condonation since the parties "voluntarily cohabited" after
the plaintiff claimed to have discovered his wife's sodomy. 9 The
Circuit Court of the City of Richmond dismissed the action because
the evidence revealed that the husband condoned his wife's sodomy.6
Although the parties did not have sexual intercourse after the
husband discovered his wife's extramarital relations, the parties
lived in the same house, shared meals and household chores, and
held themselves out to the public as a family.6
In Davis v. Davis,62 the Virginia Court of Appeals refused to find
that a wife's occasional denial of sexual intercourse with her husband
constituted constructive desertion of the marriage where the wife
continued to perform her marital duties.6" Thus, the court of appeals
concluded that the trial court did not err when it granted the wife a
divorce on the basis of a one-year separation.'
55. 46 Va. Cir. 333 (Richmond City 1998).
56. See id. at 334.
57. See id. (citing VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-365 (Repl. Vol. 1996), which defines adultery as
voluntary sexual intercourse with any person not his or her spouse).
58. See id.
59. See Glaze v. Glaze, No. HJ-1323-4 (Richmond City Jan. 27, 1999).
60. See id., slip op. at 2, 4.
61. See id.
62. No. 1819-97-3, 1998 Va. App. LEXIS 307, at *1 (Va. Ct. App. June 2, 1998)
(unreported decision).
63. See id. at *5 (noting that the parties continued to have sexual relations every two or
three weeks until the week prior to their separation),
64. See id. at *3.
9471999]
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2. Legislative Developments
There was no action taken in the 1999 session of the General
Assembly on a bill prohibiting a no-fault divorce in cases where the
parties have minor children and one party files a written objection
to the initial pleading within twenty-one days of service."
V. SPOUSAL SUPPORT
Legislation significantly revising Virginia's spousal support
statute, Virginia Code section 20-107.1, became effective on July 1,
1998.66 The legislation sought to balance the need for interdepen-
dence during marriage with the need for independence after
67Wihtemarriage. With the enactment of these changes, Virginia became
the last state in the country to give judges the authority to grant
spousal support for a period of defined duration. This defined
duration award is referred to as "rehabilitative alimony.""8
Effective July 1, 1998, judges, in their discretion, may order
spousal support to "be made in periodic payments for a defined
duration, or in periodic payments for an undefined duration, or in a
lump sum award or in any combination thereof."9 Under the statute,
defined duration "means a period of time (i) witha specific beginning
and ending date or (ii) specified in relation to the occurrence or
cessation of an event or condition."70
Courts also may reserve the right of a party to receive spousal
support in the future.7' When courts reserve a spouse's right to
65. See H.B. 1163, Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg. Sess. 1999).
66. VA. CODEANN. § 20-107.1 (Cum. Supp. 1999).
67. REPORT OF THE FAMILY LAW SECTION OF THE VIRGINIA STATE BAR, REHABILITATIVE
ALIMONY AND THE RESERVATION OF SPOUSAL SUPPORT IN DIVORCE PROCEEDINGS, H. Doc. No.
55 at 7 (1997).
68. The General Assembly rejected proposed language in the amendment to Virginia Code
section 20-107.1 that included presumptions based on the length of the marriage. In
marriages of less than 5 years, the presumption would have been in favor of a defined
duration award. See PETER N. SWISHER ETAL., VIRGINIA FAMILY LAW THEORY AND PRACTICE
§ 9-6.1(b), at 16 (2d ed. Supp. 1998). For marriages of 5 to 20 years, there would have been
no presumption. See id. at 17. In marriages of more than 20 years, the presumption would
have been in favor of periodic awards of undefined duration. See id. Legislators who opposed
this language were concerned that such presumptions would result in an abused spouse
staying in the marriage to qualify for a longer period of support or conversely, that spouses
would leave a marriage sooner to avoid the presumptions. See id. § 9-6.1(b), at 17 & 21 n.9.
69. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-107.1(C) (Cum. Supp. 1999).
70. Id. § 20-107.1(G) (Cum. Supp. 1999).
71. See id. § 20-107.1(D) (Cum. Supp. 1999).
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receive support, there is a rebuttable presumption "that the reserva-
tion will continue for a period equal to fifty percent of the length of
time between the date of the marriage and the date of separation."72
Once granted, the duration of a reservation cannot be modified. 3
Under the amended statute, courts must consider thirteen factors,
instead of nine, in determining the nature, amount, and duration of
a spousal support award. 4 Two of the new factors to consider are: (1)
"the age and physical and mental condition of the parties and any
special circumstances of the family; 5 and (2) "[tlhe extent to which
the age, physical or mental condition or special circumstances of any
child of the parties would make it appropriate that a party not seek
employment outside of the home."76 These new factors suggest that
courts may consider the needs of an elderly parent living in the home
and requiring the care of one of the parties or the special medical,
emotional, or educational needs of a child in determining whether a
spouse should be employed.7
A third new factor for the court to consider is the analysis of the
decisions made by the parties during their marriage "regarding
employment, career, economics, education and parenting arrange-
ments.., and their effect on present and future earning potential." 8
This includes examination of the length of time one or both of the
parties were absent from the job market. 9 This provision overrules
the general requirement to impute income to a spouse who volun-
72. Id. "Date of separation" is defined as "the earliest date at which the parties are
physically separated and at least one party intends such separation to be permanent.L" See id.
§ 20-107.1(G) (Cum. Supp. 1999).
73. See id. § 20-107.1(D) (Cum. Supp. 1999).
74. See id. § 20-107.1(E) (Cum. Supp. 1999). Six of the original nine factors have been
incorporated verbatim into the amended statute. See id. § 20-107.1(E)(2), (3), (6)-(8), (13)
(Cm. Supp. 1999). Under the amended statute, earning capacity is now a separate
consideration from obligations, needs, and financial resources of the parties. See id. § 20-
107.1(E)(1), (9) (Cum. Supp. 1999). The amended statute also provides that earning capacity
includes "the skills, education and training of the parties and the present employment
opportunities for persons possessing such earning capacity." Id. § 20-107.1(E)(9) (Cum. Supp.
1999). Similarly, the amended statute expounds on the earlier version of the statute and
provides that courts also may consider the "opportunity for, ability of and the time and costs
involved for a party to acquire the appropriate education, training and employment...
needed to enhance his or her earning ability."Id. § 20-107.1(E)(10) (Cum. Supp. 1999). Four
entirely new factors were enacted in the legislation. See id. § 20-107.1(E)(4), (5), (11), (12)
(Cum. Supp. 1999).
75. Id. § 20-107.1(E)(4) (Cum. Supp. 1999).
76. Id. § 20-107.1(E)(5) (Cum. Supp. 1999).
77. See SWISHER, supra note 68, § 9-6.1.
78. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-107.1(E)(11) (Cum. Supp. 1999).
79. See id.
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tarily stays home with minor children.8" Under the newly amended
statute, courts still may impute income to an unemployed or
underemployed spouse, but imputation is not mandatory.8' The final
new factor for the court to consider is "the extent to which either
party has contributed to the attainment of education, training, career
position or profession of the other party." 2
The amended statute requires that in any contested case in circuit
court, any order"granting, reserving or denying a request for spousal
support" must be accompanied by written findings and conclusions
of the court identifying the factors of subsection E that support the
court's ruling. 3 Thus,judges are now required to explain the criteria
upon which they rely in making a specific award.
Because the rehabilitative alimony statute as enacted does not
contain any presumptions as to when to award defined duration
spousal support, and there are not yet any published cases on this
subject, the first few cases from the Virginia Court of Appeals will be
instrumental in guiding courts, attorneys, and litigants. Since
Virginia was the last state to enact such legislation, Virginia
practitioners may find guidance in leading cases from other states
that reveal developed trends on when awards of rehabilitative
support are appropriate. 8
4
Under Virginia Code section 20-109(B),8" which also was amended
in 1998, modifications of a defined duration award must be sought
within the time period of the award. 6 The court may modify or
80. See SWISHER, supra note 68, § 9-6.1.
81. See VA. CODE ANN. § 20-107.1(E)(13) (Cu. Supp. 1999).
82. Id. § 20-107.1(E)(12) (Cure. Supp. 1999).
83. Id. § 20-107.1(F) (Cur. Supp. 1999).
84. See, e.g., Puls v. Puls, 645 N.E.2d 525, 529-30 (Ill. Ct. App. 1994) (holding
rehabilitative alimony appropriate where specific impending future decrease in the
supporting spouse's income exists); Siddens v. Siddens, 588 N.E.2d 321, 325 (Ill. Ct. App.
1992) (finding some rehabilitative alimony may be appropriate where marriage is of short
duration); Neuman v. Neuman, 816 S.W.2d 283, 285 (Mo. Ct. App. 1991) (holding that
rehabilitative alimony is appropriate where courts can reasonably foresee that "the financial
condition of the parties will change prior to the termination of the award'); Mahoney v.
Mahoney, 453 A.2d 527,533-34 (N.J. 1982) (holding rehabilitative alimony appropriate where
one spouse made past sacrifices for the marriage); Goode v. Goode, 590 N.E.2d 439, 441-42
(Ohio Ct. App. 1991) (holding rehabilitative alimony appropriate where dependent spouse's
earning potential was limited because of her status as the custodial parent and the special
needs of the parties' children).
85. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-109(B) (Cur. Supp. 1999).
86. See id. Practitioners should advise their clients that if they want to request an
extension in spousal support, they must make the motion early enough to give the lawyer
time to reinstate the case for a modification. See Deborah Elkins, Malpractice "Trap"Arises
in Rehab Alimony Statute, 'VA. LAW. WKLY., Oct. 26, 1998, at Al. A letter to this effect can
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terminate the amount or duration of the award "upon finding that (i)
there has been a material change in the circumstances of the parties,
not reasonably in the contemplation of the parties when the award
was made or (ii) an event which the court anticipated would occur
during the duration of the award, does not in fact occur through no
fault of the party seeking the modification.""7
The downside of this amended statute is its potential to increase
the costs of the litigation, increase the use and necessity of experts
to testify on some of the statutory factors, and prolong litigation, as
many parties will request modifications when their support is about
to terminate. More time is needed for courts, attorneys, and litigants
to apply and utilize the newly amended statute before its impact can
be assessed completely.
VI. EQUITABLE DISmUION
A. Classification
In Martin v. Martin,"8 the Virginia Court of Appeals, sitting en
banc, held that the trial court erred in failing to determine the
increase in value of the husband's separate property interest during
the parties' twelve-year marriage. 9 The trial court found that the
husband contributed approximately $26,634 of his separate property
to the $60,100 purchase of the couple's home, which was valued at
$110,000 at the dissolution of the marriage."0 The trial court
determined that the remaining funds for the purchase of the house
came from marital property.9 '
The court of appeals held that "where separate property can be
retraced from commingled property, the increased value in that
separate property is presumed to be separate, unless the nonowning
spouse proves that contributions of marital property or personal
effort caused the increase in value."92 In determining how to
apportion the increase in value of retraced separate property, the
avert a malpractice suit. See Baker McClanahan, Lawyers Mull Strategy on New Rehab
Alimony Law, VA. LAW. WKLY., May 25, 1998, at A19.
87. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-109(B) (Cum. Supp. 1999).
88: 27 Va. App. 745, 501 S.E.2d 450 (Ct. App. 1998) (en banc).
89. See id. at 748, 501 S.E.2d at 452.
90. See id. at 749, 501 S.E.2d at 452.
91. See id.
92. Id. at 751, 501 S.E.2d at 453.
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court of appeals applied the "Brandenburg formula."93 While not
declaring that this formula should be the exclusive method of
determining a spouse's presumptive share of the property, the court
noted that this formula was "appropriate on these facts."94 The
"Brandenburg formula" consists of the following formulas and
definitions:
(nmc/tc) x e = nonmarital
(mc/tc) x e = marital property
Nonmarital contribution (nmc) is defined as the equity in the property at the
time of the marriage, plus any amount expended after marriage by either
spouse from traceable nonmarital funds in the reduction of mortgage
principal, and/or the value of improvements made to the property from such
nonmarital funds.
Marital contribution (mc) is defined as the amount expended after marriage
from other than nonmarital funds in the reduction of mortgage principal, plus
the value of improvements made to the property after the marriage from
other than nonmarital funds.
Total contribution (tc) is defined as the sum of nonmarital and marital
contributions.
Equity (e) is defined as the equity in the property at the time of distribution.
This may be either at the date of the decree of dissolution, or, if the property
has been sold prior thereto and the proceeds may be traced, then the date of
the sale shall be the time at which the equity is computed. 5
Using this formula, the court of appeals determined that the
husband's presumptive share of the hybrid property was
approximately $48,748.96 The increase in value, calculated by
subtracting the initial $26,634 from $48,748, was $22,114.9'
The court of appeals then determined that the wife failed to prove
that the separate property was transmuted to marital property
through the application of her"real estate acumen"in persuading the
husband to purchase the property that she claimed was underpriced
93. Id. at 753, 501 S.E.2d at 454. The "Brandenburg formula" was adopted in
Brandenburg v. Brandenburg, 617 S.W.2d 871, 872 (Ky. Ct. App. 1981), and applied in
Virginia in Hart v. Hart, 27 Va. App. 46, 65-66, 497 S.E.2d 496, 505 (Ct. App. 1998) (holding
that the formula was an appropriate method to determine the value of the marital and
separate property components of a hybrid property home).
94. Martin, 27 Va. App. at 753, 501 S.E.2d at 454.
95. Hart, 27 Va. App. at 65-66, 497 S.E.2d at 505 (quoting Brandenberg, 617 S.W.2d at
873).
96. See Martin, 27 Va. App. at 753, 501 S.E.2d at 454.
97. See id.
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or by her "fixing up" the property by adding new carpet, paint, and
wallpaper.98 The court ruled that the wife offered no evidence
supporting her claims that she had experience in real estate
valuation, that the property was more valuable than the price paid,
or that the husband relied on her "personal efforts" in investing in
the property.99 Even if she had possessed some "real estate acumen,"
the court reasoned that her suggestion to purchase the property
would not be a sufficient "significant personal effort" under Virginia
Code section 20-107.3(A). 100
Furthermore, the court rejected the wife's argument that the
increase in value was the result of her contributions of marital
property by "fixing up" the house over the course of the marriage.''
In order to be a contribution of marital property, there must be an
"improvement, renovation, addition, or other contribution which, by
its nature, imparts intrinsic value to the property and materially
changes the character thereof."0 2 The court found that the painting,
wallpapering, and carpeting performed by the wife was merely
maintenance, which preserves the value of the property, but "does
not add value to the home or alter its character."
0 3
In another equitable distribution case, Moran v. Moran,104 the
Virginia Court of Appeals ruled that the husband did not satisfy his
burden of proof by demonstrating that a $30,000 renovation to a
house his wife purchased prior to marriage, paid for with marital
property, transformed the property to a hybrid asset.' 5 The court
noted that when determining if an asset is hybrid property it is
important to consider whether "value was generated or added by the
expenditure or significant personal effort," not solely by the amount
of funds or effort expended. 10 6 The court of appeals held that the
husband had not provided sufficient evidence to prove that the
renovation added any value to the house.' Nevertheless, the court
found that the property was in fact a hybrid asset because the couple
98. See id. at 754-57, 501 S.E.2d at 454-56.
99. See id. at 754-55, 501 S.E.2d at 454-55.
100. Id. at 755, 501 S.E.2d at 455.
101. See id. at 755-56, 501 S.E.2d at 455-56.
102. Id. at 756, 501 S.E.2d at 455 (citing Spindler v. Spindler, 558 N.W.2d 645, 650-51
(Wis. Ct. App. 1996)).
103. Id. at 757, 501 S.E.2d at 456.
104. 29 Va. App. 408, 512 S.E.2d 834 (Ct. App. 1999).
105. See id. at 413, 512 S.E.2d at 836.
106. Id. at 412,512 S.E.2d at 836 (citing Hart v. Hart, 27 Va. App. 46, 65,497 S.E.2d 496,
505 (Ct. App. 1998)).
107. See id. at 413, 512 S.E.2d at 836.
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used marital funds to reduce the mortgage by approximately $6,000,
thus commingling marital funds with separate property."°8
The court of appeals also found that the trial court erred when it
failed to determine the amount of passive income from the husband's
premarriage investment in a pension fund. °9 Prior to the marriage,
the husband invested $17,489 in his pension fund, that at the time
of the dissolution of the marriage, had a value of $198,000.10 The
court of appeals ruled that the husband presented irrefutable
evidence that the separate property in the pension plan earned
income of at least $44,489.111 The court accepted this figure as it was
derived from a formula that was cited with approval in a prior
decision by the court." 2
Finally, the court of appeals refused to overrule the trial court's
assignment to the husband of a $32,000 debt remaining on a loan
secured by the pension plan."' The court ruled that the trial judge
had not abused his discretion, as the judge had assigned to the wife
a debt remaining on the marital residence of approximately
$28,000."4
In Holland v. Holland,"5 the Circuit Court of Fairfax County
found that the husband's social security benefit payments, which the
husband moved from the parties' joint account to his separate
account before the parties separated, were marital property." 6 After
the court enjoined the parties from using marital assets without the
108. See id. at 414, 512 S.E.2d at 836-37.
109. See id. at 415, 512 S.E.2d at 837.
110. See id. at 414-15, 512 S.E.2d at 836-37.
111. See id. at 415-16, 512 S.E.2d at 837.
112. See id. at 416,512 S.E.2d at 837 (citing Mann v. Mann, 22 Va. App. 459,463 n.4, 470
S.E.2d 605, 606 n.4 (Ct. App. 1996)). The Moran court followed the court of appeals in Mann
by approving the method used by the Oklahoma Supreme Court in Thielenhaus v.
Thielenhaus, 890 P.2d 925, 929-30 (Okla. 1995), to calculate the marital share of a pension
plan. See Moran, 29 Va. App. at 416, 512 S.E.2d at 837. The Thielenhaus formula requires the
court to:
(1) multiply the fund's beginning balance... at the date of the marriage... (2)
times the average earning of the pension account [during the marriage] and...
(3) compound annually the interest until the date of separation... (4) subtract
that amount from ... the value of the fund ... [on the date of separation] to
arrive at a divisible marital asset.
Id., 29 Va. App. at 416, 512 S.E.2d at 838 (quoting Thielenhaus, 890 P.2d at 929-30).
113. See Moran, 29 Va App. at 417, 512 S.E.2d at 838.
114. See id.
115. No. 148131, 1999 WL 262433, at *1 (Va. Cir. Ct. Fairfax County Mar. 3, 1999)
(unreported decision).
116. See id. at*9 (noting that Virginia's equitable distribution statute is not preempted by
section 407(a) of the Social Security Act).
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consent of the other and ordered the husband to pay pendente lite
spousal support to the wife, the husband used the social security
funds to meet his spousal support obligation." The court held that
the husband committed waste when he expended marital assets in
this manner and brought the funds back into the marital estate for
distribution." 8 Thus, after this decision, practitioners should be
careful when advising clients to pay spousal support from marital
funds.
B. Valuation
In Howell v. Howell,"9 the Richmond Circuit Court held that
goodwill is an asset of a professional law practice that is subject to
valuation as marital property. 2 ' In this case, the parties were
married for thirteen years, and the husband was a partner at a large
law firm in Richmond, Virginia.'2' The husband contended that the
partnership contract buyout provision governed the value of his
partnership interest.'22 The court found that the value of his
partnership included goodwill value and required the husband to pay
the wife one-half of the value of his interest in the law firm over a
five-year period." The wife's expert testified at the Commissioner's
hearing that the husband's partnership interest "will have [intrinsic]
value to the extent it allows the holder to earn more income than is
realized by peers in comparable situations at other firms."" The
Commissioner determined that "the greater weight of the evidence
demonstrates that the Hunton & Williams partnership has goodwill
or intangible value, and that the defendant's interest should not be
valued solely by reference to the partnership agreement and the
117. See id. at *6.
118. See id at *8-9.
119. 46 Va. Cir. 339 (Richmond City 1998).
120. See id. at 345-46.
121. See id. at 339.
122. See id. at 342-43.
123. See id. at 347.
124. Id. at 345. Both parties' experts agreed that the appropriate valuation method was
"the capitalization of excess earnings." Id. at 346. The wife's expert, however, testified that
the husband's partnership interest was worth $319,659, but the husband's expert testified
that the value of his interest was only $86,770. See id. at 345. The experts disagreed "as to
the appropriate peer group for purposes of determining the defendant's excess compensation
above the median compensation for attorneys in his field" and "on the appropriate discount
rate to be applied to the value of the defendant's share in Hunton & Williams." Id. at 346.
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resulting repayment of his capital contribution.""2 The court
determined that the Commissioner's finding that the husband's
partnership interest had an intrinsic value to the parties of $319,659
was supported by "substantial and competent evidence."'26 Thus,
with the use of an expert, a party may be entitled to a percentage of
the value of the goodwill component of his or her spouse's interest in
a professional practice, in spite of provisions to the contrary in a
partnership agreement. This case is presently on appeal to the
Virginia Court of Appeals."'
C. Distribution
The Virginia Court of Appeals addressed an issue of first impres-
sion in the case of Barker v. Barker.2 ' The husband in Barker used
approximately $50,000 of marital funds to pay spousal support
payments to his former spouse.' 9 In evaluating the equitable
distribution factors and dividing the property, the trial court
"balanced [the] husband's monetary contributions to the marriage
against his use of marital funds to support his former spouse." 3 The
court of appeals held that the court may exercise its discretion and
consider payment of a separate debt with marital funds in determin-
ing an equitable distribution award.'
31
125. Id. at 345-46; see also Silberblatt v. Silberblatt, No. 1793-97-3, 1998 Va. App. LEXIS
432, at *9-10 (Va. Ct. App. Aug. 11, 1998) (unreported decision) (affirming decision of the trial
court that the value of husband's medical practice was worth more than the value of the
equipment and receivables and should include the value of the "sweat equity"), rev'd on other
grounds, No. 1793-97-3, 1999 LEXIS 434, at *1 (Va. Ct. App. July 13, 1999) (en banc)
(unreported decision). But see Young v. Young, No. 15454, 1998 WL 972256, at *19-20 (Va.
Cir. Ct. Fairfax County June 29, 1998) (unreported letter opinion) (finding that the value of
the husband's interest in his law firm was based on adjusted book value and that there was
no professional goodwill); Bundschuh v. Bundschuh, No. 2574-97-1, 1998 WL 312831, at *2-3
(Va. Ct. App. June 16, 1998) (unreported decision) (affirming trial court's findings that the
husband's medical practice did not have goodwill value and that the husband's interest in the
practice had a value of zero dollars).
126. Howell, 46 Va. Cir. at 347 (overruling husband's exception to the Commissioner's
report).
127. The oral argument for this case was heard by the Virginia Court of Appeals in July.
As of the date of this article, the Court of Appeals had not ruled on the case.
128. 27Va. App. 519,536-42,500 S.E.2d 240, 248-51 (Ct. App. 1998) (noting, however, that
the principles behind the decision are "well-established" in Virginia given Virginia Code
section 20-107.3 and the cases applying it).
129. See id. at 535-36, 500 S.E.2d at 248.
130. Id. at 536, 500 S.E.2d at 248.
131. See id. (affirming the decision of the trial court).
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VII. PROPERTY SE=rLEMENT AGREEMENTS
Virginia courts continue to favor strict construction of property
settlement agreements by consistently refusing to add provisions to
the agreements that the parties did not expressly include" 2 or to
make new contracts for the parties. 3 3 For example, courts have
refused to add provisions to property settlement agreements allowing
spousal support to continue after the cohabitation of the recipient
spouse with another person in a relationship analogous to
marriage.'34 In light of Virginia Code section 20-109, for spousal
support to survive cohabitation, "there must be an express provision
to that effect, not one presumed by inference."3 5
Similarly, inDouglas v. Hammett,'36 the Virginia Court ofAppeals
found that the husband was bound by the contractual obligations he
undertook in the parties' property settlement agreement. 37 In
132. For example, in Jarvinen v. Votaw, No. 1763-98-4, 1999 Va. App. LEXIS 156, at *1
(Va. Ct. App. Mar. 9,1999) (unreported decision), the Virginia Court of Appeals held that the
trial court erred when it ruled that the wife's remarriage prior to age 55 did not terminate her
share of her ex-husband's Foreign Service pension benefits. See id. at *2-3. The court of
appeals found that the trial court's ruling did not comport with the relevant federal statute.
See id. at *3. Neither the parties' agreement nor the final decree waived the provisions in the
statute. See id. The court concluded that the trial judge could not add a waiver provision to
the agreement to which the parties never agreed. See id.; see also McCombs v. McCombs, No.
0341-98-1, 1999 Va. App. LEXIS 66, at *3-5 (Va. Ct. App. Feb. 2, 1999) (unreported decision)
(finding that because the language in the parties' stipulation agreement was unambiguous
and clearly called for the wife to receive one-half of the aggregate value of the husband's
retirement accounts as valued on a certain date, the trial court erred when it awarded the
wife earnings that accrued on her share of the accounts after the specified valuation date).
133. See, e.g., DeVore v. DeVore, No. 0552-98-2, 1999 Va. App. LEXIS 74, at *8 (Va. Ct.
App. Feb. 2,1999) (unreported decision) (holding that to read the parties' property settlement
agreement in the manner suggested by the wife would effectively make a new contract for the
parties and indicating that the trial court should have terminated, not suspended, the ex-
husband's spousal support obligation); Michael v. Michael, No. 16944 (Va. Cir. Ct.
Rockingham County Mar. 29,1999) (holding that the court was without jurisdiction to modify
or alter the spousal support provision in the parties' property settlement agreement even
though the husband claimed that he was unable to pay the past due and future support after
he was involved in an automobile accident, had been unable to work, and had accumulated
substantial medical bills).
134. See Biddle v. Biddle, 46Va. Cir. 433,434 (Stafford County 1998). In this case, the wife
unsuccessfully argued that the parties' property settlement agreement distinguished her
primary spousal support, which was to continue as long as she did not remarry or cohabit
with someone as man and wife, from the retirement income spousal support, which was to
continue as long as the wife did not remarry. See id.
135. Id. The absence of such a provision "mandates the conclusion that spousal support
terminates upon remarriage by operation of [Virginia Code sections 20-109 and 20-109.1)."
Langley v. Johnson, 27 Va. App. 365, 373, 499 S.E.2d 15, 19 (Ct. App. 1998).
136. 28 Va. App. 517, 507 S.E.2d 98 (Ct. App. 1998).
137. See id. at 526, 507 S.E.2d at 102.
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Douglas, the parties' agreement specified that the husband was
responsible for paying "the expenses of a college education for the
child."13' The parties' son had a full athletic scholarship that covered
his college tuition, books, housing, and meals, and his mother sent
him a monthly allowance for living expenses and other incidentals
not covered by his scholarship.'39 After the son graduated, the
mother sought reimbursement for the money she sent to the son
while he was in school, including the price of the computer she
purchased for the son. 4 ° The trial court followed the "plain meaning"
of the parties' agreement and ordered that the father reimburse the
mother for the son's "college-related" expenses in the amount of
$10,123, which represented $150 per month for nine months a year
over four years and for the cost of the computer.""
White v. White'42 is another example of Virginia courts strictly
construing separation agreements. In that case, the Supreme Court
of Virginia held that where a valid divorce agreement required the
husband to make monthly payments on the $30,000 mortgage on the
marital home, the husband is not further obligated to make monthly
spousal payments equal to the remaining mortgage balance when the
wife subsequently sells the home, using the proceeds from the sale
to pay off the mortgage.'43 The court adhered to the plain meaning of
the agreement, examining the intent of the parties, and found that
the agreement required the husband to pay solely the mortgage, with
no provision for spousal support payments to Mrs. White.' Thus,
the husband's obligation to make payments existed only so long as
the mortgage existed.'45
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Virginia ruled in Lincoln National Life Insurance Co. v. Johnson14 6
that the court must adhere to the plain meaning of a couple's
property settlement agreement regarding the beneficiaries of a life
insurance policy.'47 In the agreement, the husband, who subse-
138. Id. at 520, 507 S.E.2d at 99 (noting that the parties' agreement was incorporated into
the final decree of divorce).
139. See id. at 520-21, 507 S.E.2d at 99-100.
140. See id. at 521, 507 S.E.2d at 100.
141. See id. at 522-24, 507 S.E.2d at 100-02 (following precedent that indicated that
"college expenses" includes reasonable living expenses).
142. 257 Va. 139, 509 S.E.2d 323 (1999).
143. See id. at 145, 509 S.E.2d at 326.
144. See id.
145. See id.
146. 38 F. Supp. 2d 440 (E.D. Va. 1999).
147. See id. at 447.
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quently remarried and adopted his second wife's child, agreed to
designate his children with his first wife as beneficiaries to his life
insurance policy, but never did so prior to his death. 4 8 The court
found that the husband was bound by the decree, and ruled that the
children of the first marriage were the proper beneficiaries.14 9 The
court concluded that the contractual obligations of the agreement
superceded any expectancy interest of the second wife and adopted
daughter.15
0
VIII. ADOPTION
Beginning on July 1, 1999, a birth father's consent to adoption is
not necessary where the birth father was convicted of carnal
knowledge of a child between 13 and 15 years of age and the child to
be adopted was conceived as a result of the violation. 5' The amended
statute also bars the person convicted from having a legitimate
interest in the custody and visitation of a child conceived as a result
of the violation.'52 Formerly, consent of the birth father was waived
only if the birth father was convicted of rape, adultery, or fornication
with his daughter, mother, or grandmother and the child was
conceived as a result of such acts.'53
IX. DOMESTIC VIOLENCE
Last year, the Virginia legislature passed a law allowing law-
enforcement officers to file emergency protective order petitions on
behalf of parties who are mentally or physically incapable of filing
such petitions.'54 In 1999, the Virginia General Assembly continued
to strengthen efforts to combat domestic violence. Several new laws,
effective July 1, 1999, provide additional protection to abuse victims
and additional measures to punish the offenders.
148. See id. at 445.
149. See id. at 448-49.
150. See id. at 451-52.
151. See S.B. 907, Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg. Sess. 1999) (enacted as Act of May 7, 1999, ch.
1028, 1999 Va. Acts 2718) (codified as amended atVA. CODEANN. §§ 16.1-241,20-124.1,63.1-
204, 63.1-220.2, 63.1-220.3, 63.1-225 (Cum. Supp. 1999)) (setting forth that "an entrustment
agreement for the termination of all parental rights and responsibilities with respect to the
child shall be valid notwithstanding that it is not signed by the birth father when such father
has been convicted of a violation" of Virginia Code sections 18.2-61(A), 18.2-63, or 18.2-
366(B)).
152. See id. (defining who is a person with a legitimate interest in a child).
153. See VA. CODE ANN. §63.1-220.2 (Repl. Vol. 1995 & Cum. Supp. 1998).
154. See id. § 16.1-253.4 (Cum. Supp. 1998).
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One of the new laws broadens the type of acts that can be
considered as family abuse for the purposes of determining custody
of minor children'55 and the issuance of protective orders in cases of
family abuse.'56 The definition of "family abuse" for these purposes
now includes any "act involving violence, force or threat including
any forceful detention, which results in physical injury or places one
in reasonable apprehension of serious bodily injury and which is
committed by a person against such person's family or household
member."' The former definition of family abuse included only acts
of violence, not acts involving force or threat.5 '
The Virginia General Assembly also revised the definition of
"family or household member" for purposes of protective orders in
cases of family abuse and protection under the family assault statute
to include "the person's parents, stepparents, children, stepchildren,
brothers, sisters, grandparents and grandchildren regardless of
whether such persons reside in the same home with the person."
159
Virginia Code sections 16.1-228,160 16.1-241,161 18.2-57.2 162 and 19.2-
81.3163 formerly protected only those who resided in the same home
with the abuser.
Effective July 1, 1999, when issuing emergency protective orders
in cases involving stalking, judges and magistrates may impose
conditions that they deem necessary to prevent contact of any kind,
not merely further acts of stalking or communication, by the
respondent with the person seeking the protective order.'6 '
In addition, localities now have the authority to establish family
violence fatality review teams to examine fatal family violence
incidents and create a mass of information to help prevent future
family violence.'65 The chief medical examiner is to provide "a model
155. See id. § 20-124.3(8) (Cum. Supp. 1999).
156. See id. §§ 16.1-279.1 (Repl. Vol. 1999) (protective orders in cases of family abuse),
16.1-253.4 (Repl. Vol. 1999) (emergency protective orders), 16.1-253.1 (Repl. Vol. 1999)
(preliminary protective orders).
157. Id. § 16.1-228 (Repl. Vol. 1999).
158. See id. (Repl. Vol. 1996) (defining family abuse as "any act of violence, including any
forceful detention, which results in physical injury or places one in reasonable apprehension
of serious bodily injury and which is committed by a person against such person's family or
household member").
159. Id. § 16.1-228 (Repl. Vol. 1999).
160. Id.
161. Id. § 16.1-241 (Repl. Vol. 1999).
162. Id. § 18.2-57.2(D) (Cum. Supp. 1998).
163. Id. § 19.2-81.3(F) (Cum. Supp. 1998).
164. See id. § 192-152.8(B)(1)-(3) (Cum. Supp. 1999).
165. See id. § 32.1-283.2(A) (Cum. Supp. 1999).
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protocol for the development and implementation of local family
violence fatality review teams" and act as "a clearinghouse" for the
information gathered.'66
These new laws enacted in 1999, along with the continued efforts
of the review teams and commission, will strengthen Virginia's legal
measures against family violence.
X. JURISDICTION AND COURTS
A. Judicial Decisions
In Calfee v. Calfee, 6" the Virginia Court of Appeals ruled that
upon remand of a child support case by the circuit court to the
juvenile and domestic relations district court, the circuit court is
divested of jurisdiction, including concurrent jurisdiction over the
matter, and the case is properly before the juvenile court. 68 In
Calfee, the husband appealed an order of the circuit court finding
him in contempt for failure to comply with the court's child support
order and modifying the court's previous order.169 After the wife
attempted to reinstate the matter on the circuit court's docket, the
husband asserted that the circuit court lacked jurisdiction, and that
the juvenile court had exclusive jurisdiction over these matters
because the circuit court previously remanded the case to the
juvenile court after finding that "the purpose of this matter [was]
accomplished." 7 ' The court of appeals held that once the circuit court
resolved the appeal and remanded the matter to the juvenile court,
it expressly surrendered jurisdiction to the original statutory
authority of the juvenile court pursuant to Virginia Code section
16.1-297.' The court of appeals held that "upon remand of a
judgment rendered on appeal, the former jurisdiction of the [juvenile]
court over the proceedings is restored... subject to the potential
166. Id. This statute was a recommendation of the Commission on Family Violence
Prevention. Senate Joint Resolution 396, authorizes the commission to
(i) develop recommendations related to custody and visitation matters when
family violence is present; (ii) develop and provide training to judicial pers6nnel
related to family violence; (iii) develop recommendations for a mechanism to
assure coordination across state agencies related to training and community
services that address, prevent, and treat family violence; and (iv) assist state
agencies in implementing the 1999 recommendations of the Commission.
S.J. Res. 396, Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg. Sess. 1999).
167. 29 Va. App. 88, 509 S.E.2d 552 (Ct. App. 1999).
168. See id. at 94, 509 S.E.2d at 555.
169. See id. at 91, 509 S.E.2d at 552-53.
170. Id. at 92, 509 S.E.2d at 554.
171. See id. (citing VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-297 (Repl. Vol. 1999)).
1999]
962 UNIVERSITY OF RICHMOND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 33:939
exercise of jurisdiction by the circuit court in accordance with
[Virginia] Code §§ 16.1-241,172 16.1-244173 and 16.1-296," 17' none of
which applied in this case. 17' Thus, the court of appeals held that the
circuit court surrendered jurisdiction over the child support matter
to the juvenile court pursuant to Virginia Code section 16.1-297.176
In Oxenham v. J.S.M.,177 the Supreme Court of Virginia concluded
that a juvenile court judge had the jurisdiction and authority to
appoint counsel to represent a child charged with assault and battery
on his mother.178 The child's father objected to the court- appointed
counsel because he wanted to choose counsel for his son.' s The
father obtained a writ of prohibition against Judge Oxenham in the
circuit court. 8 0 The supreme court held that Judge Oxenham had
jurisdiction to hear the assault and battery case and to appoint
172. The relevant portions of Virginia Code section 16.1-241(A)(3) provide that, unless
otherwise provided, the juvenile and domestic relations district courts have "exclusive original
jurisdiction" over all cases involving the support of a child when the support is a subject of
controversy or requires determination. However, this jurisdiction is "concurrent with and not
exclusive of courts having equity jurisdiction, except as provided in [Virginia Code] § 16.1-
244." VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-241(A)(3) (Repl. Vol. 1999).
173. Virginia Code section 16.1-244(A) provides that circuit courts, concurrently with the
juvenile and domestic relations district courts, may "determine the.., support of children
when... incidental to the determination of causes pending in such [circuit] courts." The
statute divests the juvenile courts ofjurisdiction where a divorce suit has been filed in circuit
court, "in which the.., support of children of the parties is raised by the pleadings and a
hearing is set by the... court... on such issue for a date ... within twenty-one days of the
filing." Id. § 16.1-244 (Repl. Vol. 1999).
174. On an appeal of a child support order from the juvenile court, "proceedings in the
circuit court shall conform to the equity practice where evidence is heard ore tenus." Id. §
16.1-296(F) (Repl. Vol. 1999).
175. Calfee, 29 Va. App. at 94,509 S.E.2d at 555. The court also explored the distinctions
between Virginia Code section 16.1-136 regarding an appeal of a juvenile court ruling and
Virginia Code section 16.1-244(A) regarding the divestiture ofjuvenile court jurisdiction once
a divorce action has been filed in the circuit court. See id.
176. See id. Virginia Code section 16.1-297 provides that "[ulpon the rendition of final
judgment upon an appeal from the [juvenile] court, the circuit court shall cause a copy of its
judgment to be filed with the [juvenile] court within twenty-one days of entry of its order,
which shall thereupon become the judgment of the [juvenile] court." In addition,
the circuit court may remand [the proceedings] to the jurisdiction of the [juvenile]
court... under the terms of its order or judgment, and thereafter such.., shall
be and remain under the jurisdiction of the [juvenile] court in the same manner
as if such court had rendered the judgment in the first instances.
VA. CODE ANN. § 16.1-297 (Repl. Vol. 1999).
177. 256 Va. 180, 501 S.E.2d 765 (1998).
178. See id. at 184, 501 S.E.2d at 767.
179. See id. at 182, 501 S.E.2d at 767.
180. See id.
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counsel for the child; therefore, the circuit court erred in issuing the
writ of prohibition.'
8
'
B. Legislation
The 1998 Virginia General Assembly carried over a bill 182 that
sought to replace Virginia's statutory provisions adopting the
Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction Act ("UCCJA7) 8 3 with the
Uniform Child Custody Jurisdiction and Enforcement Act
("UCCJEA7).M The UCCJEA addressed jurisdictional issues and
added measures to facilitate the enforcement of custody and
visitation orders issued in other states. 85
In addition, in the 1999 session, the Virginia General Assembly
repealed statutory provisions enacted in 1989 that established
experimental family courts. 86
XI. PROCEDURE
In Smiley v. Erickson,8 7 the Virginia Court of Appeals held that
the trial court erred when it denied the appellee's Motion to Require
Additional Security in a case where the father posted an appeal bond
of $500 to appeal his case from the juvenile court to the circuit court
and his child support arrearage was $18,975.88 The court of appeals
found this bond to be "grossly inadequate."8 9
The Fairfax County Circuit Court in Martin v. McGee 9 held that
in a juvenile court child support proceeding, posted service is only
valid where process was also mailed to the defendant pursuant to
181. See id. at 184, 501 S.E.2d at 767.
182. See S.B. 413, Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg. Sess. 1998).
183. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 20-125 to -146 (Repl. Vol. 1995 & Cum. Supp. 1999).
184. See S.B. 1087, Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg. Sess. 1999).
185. See id.
186. S.B. 1178, Va. Gen. Assembly (Reg. Sess. 1999) (enacted as Act of March 17, 1999, ch.
161, 1999 Va. Acts 190) (repealing VA. CODE ANN. §§ 16.1-296.1, 20-96.1, and 20-96.2).
187. 29 Va. App. 426, 512 S.E.2d 842 (1999).
188. See id. at 431-32, 512 S.E.2d at 844-45 (reversing and remanding the case to the
circuit court and stating that the juvenile court abused its discretion when it informed
Erickson that the court had set his appeal bond at $500).
189. See id. at 431, 512 S.E.2d at 845.
190. 46 Va. Cir. 87 (Fairfax County 1998).
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Virginia Code section 8.01-296(2)(b).' 91 Accordingly, the juvenile
court's child support order was void where the Division of Child
Support Enforcement failed to satisfy the mailing requirement of
that section. 192
XII. CONCLUSION
In the past year, Virginia courts have handed down numerous
decisions in the area of domestic relations law that will impact
litigants and attorneys. In addition, in its 1998 and 1999 sessions,
the Virginia General Assembly significantly refined and modified
Virginia's domestic relations laws. To date, however, Virginia courts
have not addressed or analyzed these recent legislative enactments.
Practitioners should watch for new cases offering guidance on the
application and interpretation of recent judicial decisions and
amended statutory provisions.
191. See id. at 92.
192. See id. (dismissing the Rule to Show Cause against the respondent).
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